1949 Armistice Agreement Palestine

1949 Armistice Agreement Palestine

Bar-Yaacov, Nisan. The Israeli-Syrian Armistice: Problems of Implementation 1949-1966. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1968. According to Avi Shlaim, in March 1949, when Iraqi forces withdrew and ceded their positions to the Jordanian legion, Israel conducted Operation Shin-Tav-Shin, which allowed Israel to renegotiate the ceasefire line in the Wadi Ara region of the northern West Bank in a secret agreement embedded in the general ceasefire agreement. The green line was redesigned in blue ink on the south map to give the impression that a movement had been made in the green line. [15] The most difficult issue at the root of occasional violence was the widespread infiltration of Palestinians (mostly in 1948 refugees) beyond the borders of the armistice. These actions provoked Israeli reprisals and called into question the feasibility of Article II of the agreement. Nevertheless, both parties were unwilling to destroy the foundations of their GAA and continued to use their mechanisms to exchange mutual complaints and keep alive the fragile status quo. The no manslands designated by the GAA were divided by agreement; the twice convoy to the Israeli enclave at the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus was authorized to supply Israeli police stationed in Mount Scopus and to regularly replace the police; The reciprocal vulnerability of the citizens of Jerusalem has prompted both sides to keep the city`s dividing lines calm most of the time. The capture of Jerusalem and the West Bank in June 1967 by Israeli troops ended the applicability of the Jordanian-Israeli GAA, as neither the Jordanian civilian government nor the Jordanian army had ever returned to these territories.

The 1994 peace agreement between Jordan and Israel led to the end of the gaA between Jordan and Israel. The first GAA was signed on 24 February 1949 by Colonel Mohammad Ibrahim Sayf el-Din for Egypt and Walter Eytan for Israel on the Greek island of Rhodes. It provided, among other things, for large demilitarized zones in the Nitzana-AbuAgayla sector. On the other hand, the rights of Israeli navigation through the Suez Canal and the Tiran Strait have not been defined. Israel considered that the closure of these waterways was incompatible with international law and ceasefire rules and repeatedly drew the attention of the UN Security Council to the blockade of Suez. But neither the support received in the form of UN Security Council Resolution 95 (1951) nor the military achievements of the 1956 Sinai campaign were successful in changing Egypt`s opinion, and the blockade in the canal lasted thirty years. Between February and July 1949, general ceasefire agreements (GAAs) were signed between the State of Israel and four Arab states: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Iraq, which had participated in the war with an expeditionary force, did not reach an agreement since it had no common border with Israel; His troops were leaving the arena. All negotiations were negotiated on behalf of the United Nations (UN) by Ralph Bunche, whose performance won him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1949. These agreements ended the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.

The inability of the UN Mediation Commission for Palestine to conclude broader peace agreements has led de facto to a situation that has made general ceasefire agreements quasi-permanent agreements governing relations between Israel and its Arab neighbours until the 1967 war.