10 Sep Agreement Vs Social Contract
An empirical approach follows Sellings (1960) from early work on negotiation and game theory by examining how real people negotiate and reach an agreement. Pioneers of experimental economics used laboratory experiments to study how subjects behaved in the event of division problems (Hoffman et al. 2000, Smith, 2003). Some of the most interesting results have come, perhaps surprisingly, from asymmetrical negotiation games such as the ultimatum game (Smith, 1982). Since these first experiments, considerable experimental work has been carried out on negotiation problems and cooperation agreements in the economy. Much of the more philosophical work focuses on the importance of social norms and conventions in determining outcome (Bicchieri 2016, Vanderschraaf for publication). These two principles are linked by a particular order. The first principle of the distribution as far as possible of public freedoms with respect for equality is before the second principle, which distributes social and economic goods. In other words, we cannot choose to give up some of our civil liberties in favor of greater economic advantage. On the contrary, we must meet the requirements of the first principle before moving on to the second. From Rawls` point of view, this series of principles expresses a fundamental rational preference for certain types of goods, that is, those embodied in civil liberties, over other types of goods, that is, economic advantage. We have always distinguished the problem of direction from the deliberal model.